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Abstract
The importance of the reuse of components and materials from post-consumer products has
been widely recognized in the literature and in practice. In this paper, we address the problem
of choosing the appropriate channel structure for the recollection of post-consumer products from
customers. Speciﬁcally, we consider a manufacturer who has three options for collecting such prod-
ucts: (a) she can undertake the recollection eﬀort herself, (b) she can provide suitable incentives
to an existing retailer (who already has a distribution channel) to undertake the recollection eﬀort,
and (c) she can subcontract the recollection eﬀort to a third party. Based on our observations in
the industry, we model the three options described above as decentralized decision-making systems
with the manufacturer being the Stackelberg leader. When considering decentralized channels,
we ﬁnd that ceteris paribus, agencies that are closer to the customer, e.g. retailers, are the most
eﬀective undertakers of the recollection eﬀort for the manufacturer. Coordination mechanisms are
then characterized which enable the diﬀerent players to achieve proﬁts that are equivalent to the
proﬁts in a coordinated channel.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The importance of the environmental performance of products and processes for the operation of
the overall business is increasingly being recognized. One of the central themes which has emerged
from the current legislation introduced in Europe, North America and Japan is that producers
should assume the responsibility of their products from the cradle to the grave. The corporate
response to the evolving environmental performance requirements has been proactive in a large
number of cases. For example, car manufacturers, including DaimlerChrysler (Automotive News,
1999) and BMW (Thierry 1997, BMW Environmental Report 1997) are beginning to insist that
their suppliers abide by the same strict environmental guidelines that they have set for themselves.
Recently, joint ventures for research and development on recovery processes have been set up, eg.,
the one by BMW, Renault and Fiat (Chemical Marketing reporter, 1994), who agree to recover
and process each other’s cars abroad for recovery. Other examples of such product categories
are one-time use cameras (Kodak), copy and print cartridges (Xerox, Canon and Accutone), and
copiers (Agfa Gevaert, Océ and Xerox). In all these cases, product recovery activities and decisions
about product recovery management are perceived as an integral part of the product development
and original manufacturing process of the products (Thierry et al. 1995).
The organization of product take-back systems and the reuse of old products varies largely
depending on the product characteristics, the structure of the supply chain, and industry experi-
ence. For example, in the electronics industry, product take-back activities are managed by the
equipment manufacturers in parallel with the distribution of new products (Xerox Environmental
Report 1997). Xerox has been a leader in reusing their high value, end of lease copiers in the
manufacturing of new copiers which meet the same strict quality standards. The company reports
that the green manufacturing program saves the company $200 million a year through the reuse
of parts and materials (Fiona 1993). In a similar vein, Hewlett-Packard encourages customers to
return their used computers or peripherals to any HP oﬃces from where the products are later
sent to one of HP’s hardware recycling centers in the UK, France or Germany for refurbishing,
remanufacturing or recycling. In the automotive industry in the US and Europe, joint ventures for
used car recovery have been established between the manufacturers and the existing network of
dismantlers. Vehicle recycling research partnerships among the big car manufacturers such as the
2one managed by Ford, GM and DaimlerChrysler (Fortune 1995) provide relevant auto recycling
technologies to dismantlers to achieve a high return on investment and recyclability from vehicle
recovery1.
Most consumer products such as one-time use cameras (Kodak), and print and copy cartridges
(Xerox, Canon and Accutone) are directly returned from the retailers or from the customers to
the manufacturer, to be fed into the original supply stream. Kodak collects cameras back from
large retailers who also develop ﬁlms for customers. The company recovers seventy-six percent of
the weight of a disposed camera in the production of a new one. Each time a camera is returned
to Kodak, the retailer is reimbursed both a ﬁxed fee per camera and the transportation costs.
Print and copy cartridges, which are largely distributed through manufacturer outlets (Xerox and
Canon), are directly collected back from the customers using prepaid mail boxes provided by the
manufacturer. Similar to the one-time use cameras, they are disassembled and remanufactured
into new products of the original quality.
In this paper, our goal is to examine the implications of the manufacturer’s reverse channel
decision on the supply chain proﬁt s . W ef o c u so nt h ec a s e sw h e r et h eu s e dp r o d u c t sw h i c h
are collected back from the consumers are remanufactured into products of the original quality.
Based on observations from current practice and the literature on reverse logistics channels, we
consider three product take-back channel structures: (a) manufacturer undertaking the collection
directly from the customers (b) manufacturer contracting the collection activity to the retailer (c)
manufacturer contracting the collection activity to a third party. We consider channel members
to be independent entities, maximizing some form of an objective function which is dependent on
the performance of reverse channel activities. Speciﬁcally, the research questions that we address
in this paper are as follows:
(a) What are the implications of diﬀerent reverse channel structures on the supply chain proﬁts?
How does the incentive to invest in product take-back change under each reverse channel structure
and what are its implications for the pricing decisions of the manufacturer and of the retailer?
(b) How can the manufacturer achieve coordination in the distribution channel when product
1Some of the recently established joint ventures are: Volkswagen-Evert Heeren (Germany); Volvo and AB
Gotthard Nilson and Stena Bilfragmentering AB and Bildemontering AB (Sweden); Renault-BMW-Fiat and 100
licenced dismantlers (Europe).
3take-back activity is managed by the retail outlet or by a third party?
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the following subsection, we brieﬂyd i s c u s s
the contribution of our paper to the current literature on supply chain management, and the
research on distribution channel design and coordination issues. Section 2 is devoted to the
conceptualization of the model and Section 3 to the model formulation. Following the development
of the model, the analytical results for the optimal reverse channel structures are presented in
Section 4. Section 5 examines channel coordination mechanisms with product recovery. We
outline the limitations of this work and possible directions for future research in Section 6.
1.1 Extant Literature
Reverse logistics channels have been of interest to researchers in both operations management
and marketing. At a broad level, Fleischmann et al. (1997) review the current research in the
quantitative analysis of reverse logistics systems. However, these studies focus on operational
decisions and do not consider any incentive conﬂicts in decentralized channels which may exist
between diﬀerent reverse channel entities. Stern et al. (1996) describe the role and the function
of each channel member in diﬀerent reverse logistics structures. However, this stream of research
has largely been exploratory or descriptive and lacks a quantitative basis for comparing diﬀerent
channel structures.
Distribution channel design and coordination mechanisms between forward channel partners
have been an extensively evolving area of research. The analytical marketing literature on channel
choice follows two streams with the ﬁrst group of articles concentrating on equilibrium channel
structures and the second group on coordination mechanisms. McGuire and Staelin (1983) model
a channel of two manufacturers selling competing but diﬀerentiated products through a single
outlet. They investigate under what conditions a manufacturer may want to place an interme-
diary between itself and the next level in the channel. Coughlan (1985) extends this research
to a generalized demand function and tests its implications empirically. Similarly, Choi (1991)
examines an industry context with two manufacturers and a single retailer for both linear and
non-linear product demand functions. Lee and Staelin (1997) generalize the above work to a com-
petitive environment with two manufacturers and two retailers. They look at an uncoordinated
channel structure, and analyze the vertical strategic interactions between the manufacturers and
4the retailers. However, none of these articles explicitly consider reverse channel design from the
manufacturer’s point of view. The second group of articles deals with the design of mechanisms to
enhance coordination between the channel members’ decisions. Jeuland and Shugan (1983) show
that proﬁt sharing and more speciﬁcally, quantity discounts can be a useful tool for coordination of
price and non-price decisions of a manufacturer and a retailer. Quantity discounts as coordination
mechanisms have also evoked interest in the operations literature. Goyal (1977) and Weng (1995)
study the topic of buyer supplier coordination and joint economic lot sizing. Corbett (1996) ex-
tends this stream of research to the asymmetric information case by comparing diﬀerent discount
schemes without making the assumption that the supplier or the buyer knows the other channel
partner’s cost. For a review of the literature on this subject, see Goyal and Gupta (1989) and
Benton and Park (1996). This paper complements the existing research in distribution channel
choice and coordination mechanisms by exploring the implications of assigning a dual role to a
forward channel member. Speciﬁcally, we question how channel proﬁts and the attractiveness of
product take-back are aﬀected if the retailer assumes the product’s collection responsibility. We
explicitly model the eﬀect of pricing decisions of the diﬀerent players on the demand, and analyze
incentive conﬂicts within decentralized channels. Our analysis looks at coordination possibilities
between the manufacturer and the retailer with product take-back.
In the supply chain management literature, ﬂexible ordering and return policies for retailers in
cases of uncertain market demand have been studied by several authors. The returns which are
of interest in these studies occur at the end of a selling period due to overstocking decisions of the
retailers. Pasternack (1985), Emmons and Gilbert (1996) and Donohue (1996) determine optimal
product return contracts from the point of view of the manufacturer. Related to this, Padman-
abhan and Png (1997) explore the impact of ordering ﬂexibility provided by return contracts on
retail level competition. In contrast, we consider products which are returned from customers and
are post consumer goods which can be remanufactured into new products. We also explore how
buyback payments can be incorporated into channel coordination mechanisms. Additionally, there
are several papers which examine the implications of supply chain design decisions on inventory
cost of products both for the manufacturer and for the distributor (Lee 1996, Lee and Tang 1997,
Lee and Tang 1998). We add to the stream of research on supply chain design by modeling the im-
plications of the manufacturer’s reverse channel choice on unit production costs and furthermore
5examine its eﬀect on channel pricing decisions under each product take-back structure.
There is a related stream in the economics literature on durable goods where used products
would meet consumers’ demand and would at the same time compete with new products. However,
this stream focuses on the planned obsolescence and secondary markets (e.g. Swan 1972, Bulow
1982, Bulow 1986). More speciﬁcally, these papers address a monopolist’s decision to invest in his
product’s durability when there is a possibility of cannibalization of new products by the old ones
in the secondary market. While our interest is on the design of the systems that would enable
the eﬃcient collection of the durable products, the question of how durable a product should be
is also relevant in a remanufacturing context and we identify it as a future research topic. In the
next section, we conceptualize the model and elaborate on the model assumptions.
2M o d e l D e s c r i p t i o n
Consider the following scenario. Suppose that the manufacturer has incorporated a recovery
process for used products into her original production system, thereby being able to remanufacture
a returned used unit into a new product. Thus, a product can be manufactured directly from raw
materials, or by remanufacturing part or whole of a returned unit into a new product.We assume
that producing a new product by using a returned unit is less costly than manufacturing a new
one. This assumption states that savings from materials and assembly of subsystems within the
new product dominate the additional costs of disassembly, inspection for reusability, and the cost
of remanufacturing of a returned product2. Ceteris paribus, the manufacturer strictly prefers a
higher product return rate to a lower product return rate from the market. Denote cm as the
unit cost of manufacturing a new product, and cr as the unit cost of remanufacturing a returned
product into a new one. cr is assumed to be the same for all returned products. This assumption
can easily be relaxed by incorporating a yield rate on returned product quality. The yield rate
models the variance in reusability of post-consumer products due to diﬀerent usage patterns3.W e
2Kodak incorporates considerations such as part reusability, ease of disassembly and recoverability into the
product design process for its single-use camera line. This enables them to easily disassemble returned cameras
and thus manufacture new ones at lower unit costs by only replacing parts such as lens and battery.
3It can easily be shown that the uncertainty in the returned product quality reduces the incentives to invest in
product take-back activities since the beneﬁt from investing in collection eﬀort will be lower.
6characterize the reverse channel performance by the product return rate from the market. Since
product take-back is a costly activity, and there are no secondary markets, the manufacturer
invests in collection activities to achieve a return rate that would at most match the current
demand rate for her product. This observation enables us to model the variable τ which denotes
the fraction of the current demand supplied from returned products. The average unit cost of
manufacturing can be written as c = cm(1−τ)+crτ. Note that when all demand is satisﬁed from
returned products (i.e. τ =1 ) , c = cr. If the return rate of used products is zero, then all demand
will be satisﬁed from manufactured units and therefore c = cm. If we denote unit cost savings from
recovery by ∆ where ∆ = cm − cr , the average unit cost can also be represented by cm − τ∆.
In our model, we assume that products are distributed through an independent retailer. The
assumption made for the product’s distribution channel structure enables us to explore the impli-
cations of assigning a dual role to a forward channel member. Speciﬁcally, if the retailer undertakes
the collection eﬀort, he not only determines the quantity demanded in the market by setting the
retail price of the product, but also by his collection eﬀort level, he inﬂuences the average manufac-
turing cost of the product. Even though we consider a single manufacturer-retailer structure, the
manufacturer can in fact sell to diﬀerent retailers if the retailers are not in direct competition. The
manufacturer can also manufacture competing brands, but she does not sell competing brands to
the same retailer and the brands do not share the same manufacturing process4. The retailer can
also carry many brands but we consider only one brand for which he takes decisions independent
of the other existing brands. This enables us to focus on the game between one manufacturer and
one retailer in determining the optimal market characteristics. The distribution channel decision
variables are simply the wholesale price of the product, w which is determined by the manufacturer
and the retail price of the product, p decided by the retailer.
As stated before, the primary aim of this paper is to examine the impact of the reverse channel
structure (the agent involved in the collection eﬀort) on supply chain proﬁts. Assuming that the
cost of collection as a function of the product return rate is the same under each channel format,
we compare the incentives to invest in product recovery for diﬀerent agents. The cost of collection
is modeled with both ﬁxed and variable cost components, where the product return rate observed
4This enables us to decouple the cross-brand elasticities in recommending a suitable reverse channel to the
manufacturer in diﬀerent environments.
7from the market is a concave function of the ﬁxed investment in product recovery activities5.F o r
instance, the ﬁxed investment would correspond to any promotional activities that would increase
awareness. Speciﬁcally, if the ﬁxed cost of investment is given by I, τ = Bo
√
I where Bo is a scaling
constant6. In addition, the cost of collection increases with the number of the units collected, as
recovering the product from the consumer and sending it to the manufacturer would incur a cost
proportional to the amount of the older products that are recovered. Speciﬁcally, we model the
variable cost of collection by AτD(p) where A i st h ec o n s t a n tu n i tc o s to fc o l l e c t i o na n dτD(p) is
the total number of units taken back from the customers. Thus, the total cost of collection as a
function of the fraction of products that are reused (τ)i sg i v e nb y :C(τ)=I +AτD(p)=Bτ2 +
AτD(p)7.
Decentralized reverse channel structures are classiﬁed into three categories: the retailer owned
collection channel (RC System, Figure 1.b), the manufacturer owned collection channel (MC
System, Figure 1. c ) ,a n dt h et h i r dp a r t yo w n e dc o l l e c t i o nc h a n n e l( T P CS y s t e m ,F i g u r e1.d).
As a benchmark case, the Coordinated Distribution and Collection Channel (CDC system,
Figure 1.a) is used, where a central decision-making unit jointly decides on the retail price of the
product p a n dt h ec o l l e c t i o ne ﬀort level τ. In section 5, we examine coordination mechanisms
with product take-back which achieve the proﬁt levels of the coordinated benchmark scenario.
In the Retailer Owned Collection Channel (RC System, Figure 1.b ), the retailer assumes a
dual role for the manufacturer. Besides distributing the product in the market, he also engages in
the collection activity of used products from the market. One characteristic of this channel format
is that the ownership of used products initially rests with the retailer after the collection. In order
to take the products back, the manufacturer pays a transfer price b per product returned to her
from the retailer8. As an example of this channel structure, Kodak currently engages retailers
who sell its products to take part in the collection activity of the disposed cameras. Similarly, for
5Hence, there are decreasing returns to investment I.
6Hence, the amount of investment to be made to achieve a return rate at a level of τo is given by Io = Bτ2
o
7Consider the reverse vending machines that are used to recover post consumer goods. Each customer who
returns a used product to these machines receives a ﬁxed payment per unit, which is represented by the parameter
A in our model. The investments in installing these machines corresponds to I, the ﬁxed investment in our modeling
framework. Also, B = 1
B0.
8Based on the assumption of strictly convex collection costs and no secondary product markets, it follows that
all the units collected by the retailer are ﬁnally returned to the manufacturer.
8electronics products, such as television sets, home appliances, personal computers, retailers also
act as collection points when products are returned to them at the moment of new sales.
Figure 1 : Reverse Channel Structures
In the Manufacturer Owned Collection Channel (MC System, Figure 1.c), the manufacturer
undertakes the collection eﬀort herself, and decides on the wholesale price w and the collection
eﬀort level, τ. An example of this form of reverse channel structure is Xerox’s network for printer
and copy cartridges in Europe. Speciﬁcally, Xerox provides prepaid mail boxes so that the used
cartridges can be sent back to Xerox at no expense to the customers9.A n o t h e rr e c e n te x a m p l ei s
the Polaroid single-use instant cameras which are distributed through independent retailers. The
used cameras are collected back directly from the customers by Polaroid. The company provides
postage paid envelopes oﬀering a two dollar rebate for each camera returned.
In addition, it is also not unusual to see the collection activity contracted by the manufacturer
to a third party, who is engaged only in the collection of the used products from the market. In
the Third Party Owned Collection Channel (TPC System, Fig 1.d) for a given transfer price b of
a used product, the third party maximizes his proﬁts to determine the collection eﬀort level, τ.
The third party operates as a broker between the customer and the manufacturer.
In determining the outcome of the game played between the manufacturer and the retailer, it is
assumed that the manufacturer has suﬃcient channel power over the retailer to act as a Stackelberg
9However, it is interesting to note that in Europe, the company covers only a set of countries for free delivery
of the used cartridges due to the increasing delivery costs of the product.
9leader. Thus, she uses her foresight about the retailer’s reaction function in her decision making.
The Stackelberg structure for the solution of similar games has been widely used in the literature
(McGuire and Staelin 1983, Weng 1995).
While analyzing the model, the three decentralized collection structures, where agents max-
imize their proﬁts independently for a single period are compared. Although the forward and
the reverse channel decisions are made in a single period setting, the model assumes the previous
existence of the product in the market. Those products sold in the previous periods can be re-
turned to the manufacturer for reuse via the reverse channel. Hence, the focus of analysis is on the
average channel proﬁts per period when similar products are introduced to the market repeatedly
(eg. Kodak introduces new models of disposable cameras which can incorporate components from
previous generations of cameras). By focusing on a single period setting, we avoid the implications
of the existence of secondary markets for used products10.W ec o m p a r et h ed e c e n t r a l i z e dd e c i s i o n
making system to a centrally controlled system to provide insights on eﬃciency loss under each
reverse channel structure . The centrally coordinated system is used as a benchmark scenario for
deriving the channel coordinating pricing scheme. The next section describes in detail the proﬁt
maximization problem of the manufacturer, the retailer and the third party in the outlined reverse
channel systems.
3 Model Formulation and Analysis
In this section, we compare the channel structures with respect to the retail price of the product,
the collection eﬀort level and the total channel proﬁts. In order to derive insights about the choice
of the collection channel, we assume a linear demand curve. The speciﬁc form of the linear demand
model which is analyzed in this section is given by: D(p)=φ − βp, with φ and β being positive
parameters, and p the price of the product. In a recent paper, Lee and Staelin (1997) show that
the vertical interaction between the channel members and the optimality of the channel strategies
depend on the convexity of the demand functions. Therefore, it should be pointed out that while
the linear demand assumption is consistent with the literature (Bulow 1982, Weng 1995) and
10Our results do not change if a two-period model is used where the recovered products in the ﬁrst period are
reused in the second period with no secondary markets in the second period.
10enables us to develop a ﬁrst cut analysis of the reverse channel decision of the manufacturer, the
generalizability of the results to non-linear demand functions is a question of future research11.
The proﬁt functions of the channel members can trivially be shown to be concave in the decision
variables, so the ﬁrst order conditions are used throughout to characterise the optimal decision
variables. As a benchmark scenario, we ﬁrst analyze the case of no-recovery.
3.1 The No Recovery Case
In the coordinated channel without recovery, the total system proﬁts are : ΠC
T =( φ−βp)[p−cm].
The ﬁrst order conditions for the optimal retail price result in p∗
C =
φ+βcm




In the decentralized channel without recovery, the retailer’s proﬁts are given by ΠR =( φ −
βp)[p − w], from which we obtain the optimal retail price as a function of the wholesale price
as p∗ =
φ+βw
2β , using the ﬁrst order condition. The manufacturer’s proﬁts are given by ΠM =
(φ − βp∗)[w − cm]. The manufacturer assumes that the retailer is going to act optimally, and
accordingly sets her wholesale price w∗ =
φ+βcm




8β , the retailer’s proﬁts to be Π∗
R =
(φ−βcm)2
16β and the decentralized total system




16β . T h er e s u l t so ft h en or e c o v e r yc a s ea r es u m m a r i z e di nT a b l e112.





















Table 1: Channel Results With No Recovery
11We conjecture that the results of the model would hold for all demand patterns with non-positive elasticities
with respect to price.
12Note that the well-known result of eﬃciency being lost in a decentralized channel compared to a coordinated
channel holds here, as the system proﬁts in the decentralized channel (manufacturer + retailer) of
3(φ−βcm)2
16β are
less than the coordinated channel proﬁts of
(φ−βcm)2
4β .
113.2 The Recovery Case
We now assess the impact of product recovery on the individual proﬁts of the manufacturer and the
retailer, and on the system proﬁts. First, the optimal collection eﬀort in a coordinated channel
with one manufacturer and one retailer is expressed in closed form. The decentralized reverse
channel structures described in Section 2 are then analyzed to ﬁnd the optimal collection eﬀort in
each case, and these eﬀorts are compared with one another to derive insights into the collection
strategy for the manufacturer.
3.2.1 Coordinated Distribution and Collection Channel (CDC System, Figure 1.a)
The collection eﬀort in the coordinated channel is computed by optimizing the joint proﬁts (total
supply chain proﬁts) of the manufacturer and retailer. As stated in Section 2, the total cost of
the collection eﬀort has the form C(τ)=Bτ2 + AτD(p),w h e r eτ is the fraction of the current
demand which is to be recovered, and A and B are constants. The retailer’s gross proﬁts in
this system are given by: (φ − βp)[p − w] and the manufacturer’s gross proﬁts are given by
(φ−βp)[w−cm+τ∆]. The net joint proﬁts in the coordinated system are given by: ΠCDC(p,τ)=
(φ−βp)[p−w]+(φ−βp)[w−cm +τ∆]−Bτ2 −AτD(p). The optimal retail price p∗CDC and the
collection eﬀort τ∗CDC can be found by their respective ﬁrst-order conditions. The simultaneous
solution of the ﬁrst order conditions results in p∗CDC =
φ+βcm
2β − 1





4B−β(∆−A)2 . The demand and total proﬁts in the coordinated distribution and collection
system can be found by evaluating D(p) and ΠCDC(p,τ) at p∗CDC and τ∗CDC. The results are
s h o w ni nT a b l e2 14.
13The retail price charged is lower than the retail price in the centrally coordinated system without recovery (see
Table 1). Part of the system proﬁt gains from reduced unit variable costs is passed on to the customers as a lower
retail price, which also enhances the demand of the product.
14In the CDC system, to satisfy the condition τ∗CDC ≥ 0, note that B should assume values greater than
β(∆−A)2
4 .
To achieve comparability across diﬀerent channel structures, we will assume that the condition B ≥
β(∆−A)2
4 is
















Table 2: Channel Results with Recovery
Next, we characterize in a similar fashion the optimal collection eﬀorts in the decentralized
channel structures. In the rest of the paper we use the notation Πi
j(.) to represent the proﬁt
function of agent j15 when agent i16 is performing the collection activity.
3.2.2 Retailer Owned Collection Channel (RC system, Figure 1.b)
We ﬁrst consider the case when the retailer undertakes the collection eﬀort. The retailer’s net
proﬁts are given by ΠRC
R (p,τ)=( φ − βp)[p − w]+bτ(φ − βp) − Bτ2 − AτD(p),s i n c et h en u m -
ber of units that are recovered equal τD(p). The ﬁrst order conditions for the optimal retail
price and the collection eﬀort are given by : p∗RC =
φ+β[w−(b−A)τ∗]
2β and τ∗RC =
(b−A)
2B (φ − βp∗).
The manufacturer assumes that p∗RC and τ∗RC satisfy these conditions, and uses them to de-
termine the optimal wholesale price w∗RC. The manufacturer’s proﬁts are given by ΠRC
M (w)=





2[4B−β(∆−A)(b−A)]. The optimal value of the wholesale price can then be
used to compute the demand and proﬁts for the two parties. From the non-negativity restriction
of the manufacturer’s proﬁt function, it also follows that the condition b ≤ ∆ always holds.
3.2.3 Manufacturer Owned Collection Channel (MC system, Figure 1.c)
In this system, the retailer only engages in the distribution of the product. His proﬁtf u n c t i o ni s
given by ΠMC
R (p)=( φ − βp)[p − w].T h eﬁrst order conditions for the optimal retail price result
15j=R represents the retailer, j=M represents the manufacturer, j=TP represents the third party and j=T
represents the total channels proﬁts.
16i=RC represents the retailer owned collection channel, i=MC represents the manufacturer owned collection
channel and i=TPC represents the third party owned collection channel.
13in: p∗MC =
φ+βw
2β . The manufacturer’s proﬁts are given by ΠMC
M (w,τ)=D(p∗MC)[w−cm+τ∆]−
Bτ2 − AτD(p∗MC). Applying the ﬁrst order condition for the wholesale price and the collection




2[8B−β(∆−A)2] and τ∗MC =
(φ−βcm)(∆−A)
8B−β(∆−A)2 .T h ev a l u e so fΠ∗MC
M ,
Π∗MC
R and p∗MC are listed in Table 3.




















































































































Table 3: Channel Results with Recovery
3.2.4 Third Party Owned Collection Channel (TPC system, Figure 1.d)
As in the MC system, in this channel structure, the retailer engages only in the distribution of
the product. Hence, his proﬁt function and the optimal retail price of the product are given by:
ΠTPC
R (p)=( φ − βp)[p − w] and p∗TPC =
φ+βw
2β . The third party who performs the collection
activity maximizes ΠTPC
TP (τ)=bτD(p∗TPC) − Bτ2 − AτD(p∗TPC). Thus, the optimal value of the
collection eﬀort τ∗TPC is given by
(b−A)
2B (φ−βp∗TPC).G i v e np∗TPC and τ∗TPC, the manufacturer’s
proﬁt function follows as: ΠTPC
M (w)=( φ − βp∗TPC)[w − cm +( ∆ − b)τ∗TPC].U s i n g t h e ﬁrst










], from which the optimal retail price and proﬁts for the three parties are
calculated and tabulated in Table 3.
144M o d e l R e s u l t s
Based on the results summarized in Table 2 and Table 3, some interesting observations are made
on the performance of decentralized reverse channel structures.
Proposition 1 In the decentralized third party owned collection channel (TPC system), the man-
ufacturer sets b∗ = ∆+A
2 . In the decentralized retailer-owned collection channel (RC system),
the manufacturer passes on the entire savings in unit variable cost resulting from recovery to the
retailer, i.e., the manufacturer sets b∗ = ∆17.
Note that in the TPC system, the incentives of the third party to invest in collection is directly
driven by b. Hence the manufacturer faces the following trade-oﬀ while determining the optimal
value for b. If she assigns a large value to b, she observes a high level of investment in the collection
eﬀort by the third party (ie., a large τ value) but at the same time, her net savings from product
recovery diminishes, (ie., ∆ − b decreases) and therefore her proﬁts decrease as b approaches ∆.
We ﬁnd that the direct and the indirect eﬀects of b on the manufacturer’s proﬁts balance when
b∗ = ∆+A
2 .
Surprisingly, in the RC system, we ﬁnd a diﬀerent sort of interaction between the value of b
and the manufacturer’s proﬁts. In the RC system, the manufacturer does not extract any of the
direct savings from the unit variable cost, but prefers to pass them on to the retailer. There are
two main driving forces to this seemingly counter-intuitive result. The ﬁr s tr e a s o ni st h a tp a s s i n g
on all the savings to the retailer results in an increased payoﬀ f o rt h er e t a i l e r( h i g h e rv a l u eo f
b ∗ τ ∗ D). This acts as an incentive for the retailer to reduce the retail price of the product
and increase demand, which results in an increase in proﬁts. Also, by increasing the value of b
to ∆, the collection eﬀort τ increases, and this second order eﬀect decreases the retail price and
increases the demand even further. Consequently, the manufacturer’s proﬁts increase as a result
of the expansion in the demand.
Proposition 2 The optimal collection eﬀorts are related as follows: τ∗CDC ≥ τ∗RC ≥ τ∗MC ≥
τ∗TPC.
17For the proofs of the propositions, please refer to the Appendix A.1 .
15Note that while the total savings from collection in the TPC system are given by (b −
A)τD[p(w)], the total savings are given by (∆ − A)τD[p(w)] in the MC system. From propo-
sition 1, we see that the marginal beneﬁto fi n v e s t i n gi nτ in the TPC system is less than the
marginal gains in the MC system (i.e., (b∗
TPC − A) < (∆ − A)). Hence, the third party invests
less in the recollection compared to the manufacturer in the MC system. In addition, the man-
ufacturer can strategically set w in a way that would make product take-back more proﬁtable
and this results in a second degree eﬀect on τ. Comparing the MC and the RC systems, we see
that while both the manufacturer and the retailer face the same marginal gains from investing in
τ (i.e., b∗
RC − A = ∆ − A), the retailer can directly impact the market size. The manufacturer
can inﬂuence the retailer’s demand only by strategically choosing the wholesale price, w (there is
double marginalization), and hence the MC system has a lower level of recollection than the RC
system. The centrally coordinated system leads to the highest investment level since the decisions
are fully coordinated in the channel.
Proposition 3 The retail prices with recovery in the coordinated channel and the three cases in
the decentralized channel are related as follows: p∗CDC ≤ p∗RC ≤ p∗MC ≤ p∗TPC. Consequently,
D∗CDC ≥ D∗RC ≥ D∗MC ≥ D∗TPC.
The investment in recovering used products from the market beneﬁts only the third party
directly in the TPC system, and there is only a second-order eﬀect on the retail price18 in the
form of a lower wholesale price oﬀered by the manufacturer to the retailer. The eﬀect on the
retail price is more direct in the MC system, as the manufacturer sets a lower wholesale price
to increase demand, and thereby increases her savings in the unit variable cost through recovery.
The reduction in retail price in the RC system is the largest among the decentralized channels,
as the retailer beneﬁts the most by being able to directly inﬂuence demand. The price in the
coordinated channel is lower than all three decentralized channels, because the gains in eﬃciency
from the coordination eﬀort can be eﬀectively shared with the market to increase both demand
and proﬁts.
18The manufacturer lowers her wholesale price compared to the no recovery case to partially pass on the savings
in unit variable cost from the collection eﬀort to the customer through the retailer, thereby inﬂuencing demand.
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coordinated channel with recovery always dominate the total proﬁts in the decentralized channel




The implications of Proposition 3 form the basis of an interesting ﬁnding of the paper, viz.,
t h ec l o s e ra na g e n c yi st ot h em a r k e t ,t h em o r ee ﬃcient is the collection eﬀort for all the parties
involved in the channel. The eﬀect of loss of eﬃciency in the decentralized system is mitigated in
part by the ability to act more closely at inﬂuencing the underlying demand.
The implication of Proposition 4 and this section is that the ranking of the diﬀerent channel
structures (in terms of beneﬁts to the manufacturer and retailer) mirrors the beneﬁts to non-
channel members as well. The beneﬁts to society in terms of an increased collection eﬀort (greater
reuse of products) as well as an increased ability to buy the product (greater demand) complement
the increased proﬁts for the manufacturer and retailer in the coordinated system and RC system.
We now focus on the sensitivity of the collection eﬀort τ to the diﬀerent model parameters.
T a b l e4s u m m a r i z e st h ei m p a c to ft h em a r k e tp o t e n t i a lφ, the unit variable cost of manufacturing
cm, and the savings in the unit variable cost ∆, on the collection eﬀort τ. The collection eﬀort
increases as the market potential φ increases, which has interesting implications for recovery system
design. A high value of market potential implies higher demand and hence, a higher collection
eﬀort19.
Factor Eﬀect on Collection Eﬀort τ
Market Potential φ Increasing in φ
Unit cost cm
20 Decreasing in cm
Unit cost savings ∆21 Increasing in ∆
Table 4: Eﬀect of Model Parameters on Collection Eﬀort
19A high value of market potential could also result from customers ﬁnding environmentally-friendly products
more attractive, thereby increasing the collection eﬀort for such products.
20∆ is kept ﬁxed
21cm is kept ﬁxed.
17We also ﬁnd that for a ﬁxed ∆, the collection eﬀort is decreasing in cm and it is increasing in
∆ when cm is held constant. The ﬁrst eﬀect occurs from the fact that as cm increases, the retail
price also increases and, this leads to a reduction in demand. As the market size (scale) shrinks,
so does the proﬁtability of investing in product recovery, and hence we observe a lower level of
investment in collection eﬀort. As the unit cost savings increase, the marginal beneﬁto fi n v e s t i n g
in product take-back increases and this leads to a higher investment level in the collection eﬀort.
As the return rate of used products is high, the manufacturer faces a lower average unit cost and
hence the retail price decreases, resulting in an increase in market size. This also has a positive
second degree eﬀect on the investment level in τ. When unit cost savings increase proportionally
with cm (i.e. ∆ = kcm where 0 <k<1), we ﬁnd that for low cm and high k values, the positive
and direct eﬀect of an increase in ∆ ( i np a r a l l e lt oa ni n c r e a s ei ncm) on τ dominates the secondary
eﬀect that the reduction in market demand has on the collection eﬀort22.
Figure 2: Eﬀect of transfer price, b, on collection eﬀort, τ
Figure 3: Fraction of units recovered τ vs. B
22Please see appendix 1 for analytical results.
18The eﬀect of the transfer price (b) in the RC and TPC systems on the value of τ is also
interesting (Figure 2), in that while the collection eﬀort in the RC system increases monotonically
with the transfer price, the collection eﬀort is concave in the TPC channel with respect to the
transfer price. As the cost of the collection eﬀort (B) increases, the value of the collection eﬀort
decreases in all three systems (Figure 3) but at varying rates. The retailer’s collection eﬀort
decreases at the fastest rate, the manufacturer’s eﬀort decreases at a modest rate, while the third
party’s eﬀort reduces at the slowest rate. Put diﬀerently, the third party’s collection eﬀort is the
lowest, but also the most robust of the three channels to changes or mis-estimations in B.
Our observations in industry corroborate the ﬁndings of the model. We observe that in a large
number of industries, retailers actually undertake the collection eﬀo r to nb e h a l fo ft h em a n u f a c -
turer, eg. Kodak (Kodak Environmental Report 1997). McCartney (1999) also provides empirical
evidence to support the model ﬁndings. When the manufacturer owns the distribution channel,
as in the coordinated case, the manufacturer undertakes the collection eﬀort herself, as in the case
of Xerox (Xerox Environmental Report 1997).
In the next section, we examine mechanisms which enable the manufacturer to achieve coor-
dinated channel performance in the RC system. First, we consider an environment where all cost
parameters are common knowledge to the channel members. Next, we brieﬂy state the impact on
the manufacturer when the retailer retains private information about his collection costs.
5 Coordination in the Retailer Collecting Channel
Under the assumption of complete information about cost and demand data, we ﬁrst derive a
simple contract form which may be oﬀered by the manufacturer to the retailer to induce him to
choose an eﬀort level that maximizes total channel proﬁts23. Following the theory of incentive
contracts (see Laﬀont and Tirole, 1993), we take a principle-agent approach, with the manufacturer
as the principal. The role of the manufacturer as the principal is consistent with the spirit
of the earlier sections of this paper, which give the manufacturer the role of the leader in the
Stackelberg game. The manufacturer can inﬂuence the retailer’s choice of the collection eﬀort
23In Appendix A.3, we also provide a similar analysis for possible coordination alternatives when the third party
is the collecting agent.
19level by specifying a contract of the type W(τ)=[ w(τ),F].H e r e , w(τ) stands for a wholesale
pricing scheme contingent on the fraction of the market demand satisﬁed from returned products,
and F is a ﬁxed payment made by the retailer to the manufacturer which distributes the eﬃciency




















R is the retailer’s proﬁt level realized in the decentralized channel structure, and
ΠRC
R (W(τ),b)=[ p − w(τ)]D(p)+b ∗ τ ∗ D(p) − C(τ) − F is the proﬁt function of the retailer
under the contract W(τ) .T h e ﬁrst two constraints are the incentive compatibility constraints
for τ and p respectively, while the last constraint is the individual rationality constraint of the
manufacturer24. Proposition 5 states one form of the optimal contract that the manufacturer
oﬀers the retailer.
Proposition 5 The form of the optimal contract, W∗(τ)=( w∗(τ),F∗), which ensures that the
retailer undertakes the coordinated eﬀort level and charges the optimal coordinated retail price is
given by: w∗(τ)=cm − (∆ − b)τ,0 < τ < 1 and F∗ = Π∗CDC − Π
−
R.
The proof of the proposition is in Appendix A.2. As stated in the above proposition, to ensure
that the retailer’s proﬁt maximizing collection eﬀort is indeed equal to the coordinated channel
eﬀort level, the manufacturer oﬀers a wholesale pricing scheme contingent on the collection eﬀort
level characterized by the term (∆ − b)τ. Speciﬁcally, the manufacturer puts the retailer in
a position where he directly internalizes the cost consequence of his collection eﬀort. Besides
ensuring the coordinated channel eﬀort level, the contract also provides a means for making the
retail price of the product equal to the coordinated channel price level, thereby making the process
more eﬃcient for the market (in terms of increased demand). Our ﬁndings are consistent with the
extant literature in marketing and economics which shows that if the manufacturer transfers the
24A detailed explanation of these constraints can be found in Appendix A.2.
20products at the realized unit cost of production, the coordinated channel retail price and proﬁt
levels can be attained in the decentralized setting.
In this paper, without loss of generality, we assume that all the eﬃciency gains are collected by
the manufacturer, leaving the retailer with a proﬁt level as high as he would have if the contract
were not put into practice25. Hence, F ∗ = Π∗CDC − Π
−
R. This ﬁx e dp a y m e n tc a nb es e e na sa
franchisee fee paid by the retailer to the manufacturer in order to have the rights not only to sell
the product in the market but also to collect the disposed units.
The operations and marketing literature have used quantity discounts and ﬂexible ordering
policies in conjunction with ﬁxed payments (also referred to as franchisee fees) extensively as
mechanisms for coordination in decentralized channels. This paper also shows that wholesale
pricing schemes can be used in conjunction with franchisee fees to coordinate reverse decentralized
channels.
When the manufacturer has only partial information about the collection cost structure of the
retailer, then an eﬀective retailer (low collection cost) has an incentive to signal a high collection
cost structure to the manufacturer and increase his proﬁts. When the complete information
assumption about the cost of collection is not met, we ﬁnd that the manufacturer can design a
menu of contracts where each contract on the menu has a similar form as the contract deﬁned for
the full information environment. The menu is deﬁned to induce the retailer to reveal his private
information about the cost of collection to the manufacturer. Since the insights under incomplete
information are similar to the full information case, we do not report the model analysis in detail
(Savaskan et al. 2000).
The model presented to analyze the diﬀerent product recovery systems shows that the coordi-
nated system has the best performance for all parties, as the market demand and collection eﬀorts
are the highest, and the manufacturer and retailer pareto-optimize their proﬁts in the coordinated
system. In the decentralized reverse channels, we ﬁnd that the most preferable agent to undertake
the collection eﬀort is the retailer, followed by the manufacturer. The model shows that unless
the third party or the manufacturer has signiﬁcantly better systems for collection (i.e., lower B
25Since the manufacturer is the principal in this model, the manufacturer can use her power to hold back all the
gains of eﬃciency from channel coordination. However, in a real setting, the implementation of such a contract
may be tenuous, and a more satisfactory arrangement will have both parties sharing the gains from coordination.
21values than the other agents), the retailer should undertake the collection eﬀort in a decentralized
decision-making unit.
We also show that the results of a coordinated channel always pareto-dominate the results of
a decentralized channel under complete information, and then discuss coordination mechanisms
that the manufacturer can oﬀer the retailer to exploit system eﬃciency gains. We now summarize
the contributions and limitations of the paper and identify related topics of interest for future
research.
6 Contributions, Limitations and Future Research
Designing eﬀective product recovery systems has important ramiﬁcations for proﬁtable organiza-
tions, regulatory bodies and the market. The ﬁrst contribution of this paper has been to identify
the appropriate reverse channel structure for OEMs to undertake their recollection eﬀort. We
show that ﬁrms can design recovery systems to enhance their proﬁts and market demand, and in
conjunction, can increase the degree of reusability of older products. Coordination mechanisms are
suggested to better achieve the above aims by providing suitable incentives in the form of simple
two-part tariﬀs (a per unit wholesale price coupled with a franchisee fee), to align the objectives of
the members in the reverse channel. The results suggest that like other methods suggested in the
literature (quantity discounts and ﬂexible ordering policies), product recovery systems can also be
used as eﬀective tools for channel coordination. We can also show that if there is an asymmetry
of information between the manufacturer and the retailer where the manufacturer does not know
the retailer’s cost of collection, she can create suitable contracts to minimize the impact of the
asymmetry on her own and the system’s proﬁts.
In the early phase of this research, we have made a number of assumptions that must be re-
laxed in future research to develop a more comprehensive understanding of “green” manufacturing
practices in general, and product recovery systems in particular. We assume that for the agency
who implements the recollection eﬀort, an infrastructure for the logistics of getting products back
from customers and delivering them to the OEM already exists independent of the recollection
eﬀort. Future research in this area should consider the impact of the ﬁxed setup costs that are
to be incurred in establishing a network for the reverse logistics function. Based on the model
22analysis and insights, we conjecture that a high cost of establishing such a network would make it
even more appropriate for a forward distribution channel member (eg. retailers) to undertake the
recollection eﬀort, as such networks are already in place in typical systems for forward distribution
activities. The paper considered only a single agent undertaking the recovery process. If there
are multiple agents (eg. retailers) undertaking the recovery process in separate markets (such as
geographically dispersed markets), the results of the model are not aﬀected. Savaskan and Van
Wassenhove (2000) study the impact of two retailers competing to recover and distribute to the
same market. The location of the agents vis-a-vis the consumers and proximity to the market was
not considered in this research. If the recovery is done through a ﬁxed price delivery system (such
as prepaid envelopes in the regular mail), then the results of the model are not aﬀected. Studies
that look at the impact of diﬀerent agents undertaking recollection with diﬀerent geographical
distances from the consumer would be useful for enhancing the understanding of the logistics of
product recovery systems.
We also assume that the ﬁrm has designed the product platform for reuse so that older products
can be easily incorporated partially or wholly into the new product (Xerox 1997). An extension
of this study should consider product platform design issues to make products easier to reuse.
This research assumed that all the products that are recovered are usable for remanufacturing
into new products. When products having diﬀerent lifetimes are returned, it would be useful to
incorporate yield factors into this study to determine the impact on product recovery. Future
research should investigate the eﬀect of the degree of product durability in the recovery process.
While we modeled that reusing older products in new generations would incur lower unit variable
costs due to savings in assembly equipment, material costs, etc. we did not explicitly study detailed
practices for lowering unit variable costs. There is a need for empirical research in this area to
quantify the sources of savings through product recovery, and to identify product categories where
such savings are a substantial portion of the unit variable cost.
In this paper, the recollection eﬀort is undertaken from products that have been sold in the
past and are being returned in the period of consideration for the model. The results of the
model are not aﬀected in a more generic multi-period setting if products that recovered in the
previous period are used for remanufacturing in the current period. A more in-depth study should
be conducted on the eﬀect of recovered products which have been recovered in multiple periods
23before for use in remanufacturing in the current period. We also did not consider the impact
of competition between secondary markets for old products and the manufacturer’s reuse of old
products. Future research should look at the impact of this competition on the product recovery
process. It is also plausible that the manufacturer could design a product line based on completely
new products and refurbished or remanufactured products. A study on the design of such product
lines and the related cannibalization issues would be useful for practice. We also did not model
the customer’s choice process in more detail. Future studies should consider consumer utility and
choice issues in designing a product line with some remanufactured products.
At a more detailed level, the ﬁxed costs of recollecting products were assumed to be a quadratic
function of the fraction of current demand that is recovered from the market. Based on numerical
studies, we conjecture that the results of the model will broadly hold for all convex recollection
ﬁxed cost structures. Also, the costs incurred by recollection agencies of holding inventory and
transporting them in select lot sizes to the OEM over the product life-cycle have not been con-
sidered in the model. Future research should explicitly model costs associated with lot-sizing the
old products and transporting them in these lot sizes to manufacturing facilities.
In summary, this paper makes a contribution to the literature on distribution channel design
by drawing attention to reverse channels, and developing a model of the trade-oﬀs underlying
such systems. Our recommendation is that ﬁrms make a conscious choice of channel structure, as
diﬀerent channel structures are appropriate in diﬀerent environments. The qualitative framework
provided in Section 5 that summarizes the results of the model provides some guidance in this
regard. A combined design of the forward and reverse channels can not only provide the ﬁrm with
much needed ﬂexibility to reduce logistics costs for forward and reverse activities, but also enable
it to signal continued concern and action on environmental issues.
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APPENDIX
A.1 Proof of Propositions 1, 2, 3 and 4
Proof of Proposition 1: For the RC system, the proof of proposition 1 can be given as
follows. First we show that the manufacturer’s proﬁt function is concave in w for a given b.T h i s
allows us to optimize the manufacturer’s problem ﬁrst over w for a given b a n dt h e ne x a m i n et h e
27eﬀect of b. Note that in the RC system, for a given w and b, the retailer solves the following
problem: Max
p,τ (p − w)(φ − βp)+bτ(φ − βp) − Bτ2 − Aτ(φ − βp).
I tc a ne a s i l yb es h o w nt h a tt h eo p t i m a lp and τ values as a function of b and w are given by:
p
∗ =








The manufacturer takes into account the reaction function of the retailer (i.e., p∗(w,b) and
τ∗(w,b)) and maximizes the following function for b and w.
Max
w,b




4B−β(b−A)2(φ − βw)(w − cm)+
2B(b−A)(∆−b)
(4B−β(b−A)2)2(φ − βw)2.
To show that the manufacturer’s proﬁts are concave in w for a given b we examine the sign of
∂2ΠM





(4B−β(b−A)2)2 . To show
∂2ΠM
∂w2 ≤ 0 for a given b,o n e




4B−β(b−A)2 or equivalently β(b−A)(∆−b) ≤ 4B −β(b−A)2
which reduces to β(b − A)(∆ − A) < 4B. Since 4B>β(∆ − A)2 holds from the non-negativity
restriction on τ in the CDC system (Table 2) and b<∆ it follows that β(b − A)(∆ − A) < 4B
holds. Hence ΠM is concave in w for a given b.
In the the second part of the proof we examine the eﬀect of b on the proﬁts of the manufacturer.








































∂b is always positive if the factor N is positive. After some simpliﬁcation,
N turns out to be positive if
β(b−A)(∆−A)
4B ≤ 1, which follows from our assumption that τ∗TPC is
non-negative (and hence, from Proposition 4, τ∗RC, τ∗MC, and τ∗CDC are non-negative).
We follow a similar procedure for the proof of the optimal b value in the TPC system. First
we show that the manufacturer’s proﬁts are concave in w for a given b and then, we optimize over
b. In the TPC system , the retailer and the third party solve the following problems respectively
for p∗(w) and τ∗(b):Max
p (p − w)(φ − βp) and Max
τ bτ(φ − βp) − Bτ2 − Aτ(φ − βp).
The manufacturer takes into account the reaction functions of the retailer and the third party
and solves the following optimization problem for w∗.
28Max
w (φ − βp






[w − cm +
(∆ − b)(b − A)(φ − βw)
4B
]







4B ]. By rearranging the terms, it follows that the concavity
condition
∂2ΠM
∂w2 < 0 reduces to 4B>β(b − A)(∆ − b). From the non-negativity constraint on
τ in the CDC system, it follows that 4B>β(∆ − A)2.S i n c e β(b − A)(∆ − b) is equivalent
to β(b − A)(∆ − A) − β(b − A)2 which is less than β(∆ − A)2, the concavity condition 4B>
β(b − A)(∆ − b) also holds for a given b.
Next, we solve for the optimal b value which maximizes the manufacturer’s proﬁts. Note













and, this expression is minimized when β (∆ − b)(b−A) is maximized.
It can easily be shown that b∗ = ∆+A
2 .
Proof of Proposition 2 : We divide the proof into three parts. (i) To prove p∗CDC ≤ p∗RC,we
have to show that
φ+βcm
2β − 1



















4B−β(∆−A)2] or φ ≥ βcm, since the quantity within the brackets is negative.
This is true by assumption because of the requirement of positive proﬁts for the manufacturer and
retailer.














8B−β∆2] ≤ cm[ B
4B−β∆b − 2B








2 (Proposition 1),the quantity within the brackets is negative, so the
inequality reverses and by assumption (φ ≥ βcm), the result is true.







2 ≥ (∆ − b)(b − A), which follows from simple algebra.
To show (∆ − A)2 ≥ 2(∆ − b)(b − A),or to show ∆2 + A2 − 2∆b +2 b2 − 2Ab ≥ 0
This reduces to showing (∆ − b)2 +( A − b)2 ≥ 0 .
29P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 : The proof of Proposition 3 follows from simple algebra. From Table
2, Π∗RC
M ≥ Π∗MC




2 ≥ (∆−b)(b−A) from
the previous proof. The proofs of Π∗RC
R ≥ Π∗MC
R ≥ Π∗TPC





Proof of Proposition 3: The proof of Proposition 3 is analogous to the previous proof.
The eﬀect of cm on τ : We examine the eﬀect of cm on τ for the manufacturer collecting
case. Note that τ =
(φ−βcm)(∆−A)
8B−β(∆−A)2 . Substituting ∆ = kcm,w eo b t a i nτ =
(φ−βcm)(kcm−A)
8B−β(kcm−A)2 . The ﬁrst







It follows that ∂τ
∂cm > 0 for cm < cm where cm is a threshold on unit cost and cm =
φ+βA/k−2βAτ∗
2β−2τ∗βk .
A.2 Coordination of the RC System under Full Information
The ﬁrst constraint is the incentive compatibility constraint for the collection eﬀort level which
models the retailer’s selection of an eﬀort level that maximizes his proﬁts. Speciﬁcally, given the
contract W(τ), the retailer independently determines the proﬁt maximizing value for τ which
in turn sets the average unit cost of production for the manufacturer. Hence, by incorporating
incentive compatibility, the manufacturer in this way accounts for the independent decision making
process of the retailer. In a similar vein, the second constraint denotes the incentive compatibility
for the retail price of the product, and accounts for the retailer’s choice of a retail price which
maximizes his proﬁts. The third constraint is the individual rationality constraint, which ensures
that the retailer ﬁnds the contract as proﬁtable as his other alternative which is his proﬁtl e v e l
realised in the decentralized channel structure, Π
−
R .
Proof of Proposition 5: If the manufacturer decides to give the contract (w∗(τ),F∗) the
retailer optimizes the following objective function to determine p and τ:
Max
p,τ (p − cm +( ∆ − b)τ)D(p)+b ∗ τ ∗ D(p) − C(τ) − F
∗
which simpliﬁes to Max
p,τ (p − cm + ∆τ)D(p) − C(τ) − F∗
The ﬁrst order conditions w.r.t. retail price p and collection eﬀort τ are given by:




30Note that these two conditions are equivalent to the ﬁrst order condition of the centrally
coordinated channel for p and τ. Thus, the optimal retail price and the collection eﬀort level



















Hence, the retailer is not worse oﬀ with the contract and therefore accepts it. As a result, he
chooses p∗CDC and τ∗CDC for the optimal values of the retail price and the collection eﬀort level,
respectively.
Going back to the manufacturer’s problem, it remains to be shown that the proﬁts of the
manufacturer are indeed maximized under this contract form. The objective function of the
manufacturer evaluated at(w∗(τ),F∗) is given by:
ΠRC
M (w∗(τ),F∗)=
((cm − τ∗(∆ − b) − (cm − ∆ ∗ τ∗))D(p∗) − b ∗ τ∗ ∗ D(p∗)+F ∗ = Π∗CDC − Π∗RC
R .
Since the products are transfered at the marginal cost to the retailer, the manufacturer’s proﬁts
amount to the franchisee fee F ∗, which is the maximum proﬁt she can achieve while not leaving
the retailer worse oﬀ26. Note that while deriving the optimal contract, we have not assumed any
speciﬁc functional form for the market demand.
A.3 Coordination of the TPC System under Full Information
The manufacturer can achieve the coordinated channel proﬁts in the TPC system by transfer-
ring products to the retailer at marginal cost of production of the CDC system
³




26Alternatively, the manufacturer can also propose a take-it-or-leave-it contract to the retailer where she ﬁxes
the collection eﬀort level at δ
∗CDC, the wholesale price of the product at w(δ
∗CDC)=cm − (∆ − b)δ
∗CDC and
the ﬁxed payment at F∗ = Π∗CDC −Π
−
R. This contract structure also maximizes the manufacturer’s proﬁts while
inducing the retailer to show the coordinated system collection eﬀort level (Laﬀont and Tirole, 1993).
31by setting b = ∆. In order to extract the eﬃciency gains in the distribution and collection chan-
nels, the manufacturer sets two separate franchisee fees F ∗
1 for the retailer and F ∗
2 for the third
party.
Under this wholesale pricing scheme the retailer’s objective function is given by:
Max
p (p − cm + ∆δ
∗CDC )(φ − βp) − F
∗
1
The ﬁrst order condition for p∗ amounts to:
(p∗ − cm + ∆δ
∗CDC )(−β)+ (φ − βp∗)=0. It is easy to see that solution of this condition
results in p∗ = p∗CDC and D(p∗)=D(p∗CDC).







The ﬁrst order condition for τ∗ is given by: ∆D(p∗) − 2Bτ∗ =0 . solving, for τ∗,w eo b t a i n
τ∗ = τ∗CDC.
It is interesting to note that in order to achieve coordination in the TPC system, the manu-
facturer faces negative marginal proﬁts from the sales of the products. Her resultant proﬁts are
determined through ﬁxed payments of F ∗
1 and F ∗
2.
The franchisee fees F ∗
1 and F ∗
2 which maximize the manufacturer’s proﬁts while not leaving




























TP are the proﬁts of the retailer and the third party in the decentralized
uncoordinated channel structure.

































Hence, the manufacturer extracts all the eﬃciency gains from the coordination of the system.
33